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Two special administrations in 48 hours: client-asset risk returns to the boardroom

Jarvis Investment Management and ePayments Systems entered special administration within 24 hours of each other, exposing wealth managers and e-money firms to fresh client-asset scrutiny. For senior leaders, the episode reframes safeguarding, outsourced custody and FSCS perimeter questions as live board issues, not operational housekeeping.

Two FCA-authorised firms collapsed into special administration inside 48 hours this week. Jarvis Investment Management Limited entered the regime on 14 October 2026, with Adam Stephens and Philip Hemming of S&W Partners LLP appointed as special administrators (FCA). The next day, ePayments Systems Limited followed, with Mark Boast and Allister Manson of Opus Restructuring LLP taking over an e-money issuer regulated under the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (FCA). Different business models, different insolvency regimes, same board-level question: who really controls, and compensates, client funds when the music stops.

Different regimes, same pressure point

Jarvis had been operating under a voluntary requirement agreed with the FCA on 16 September 2022 that restricted the activities it could undertake without FCA consent (FCA). That the firm still reached special administration four years later is a reminder that voluntary requirements buy time, not resolution. For wealth managers and platforms that rely on Jarvis-style custody or dealing arrangements, the practical issue is immediate: clients cannot trade or otherwise use custody assets or client money held with the firm until the special administrators complete their assessment (FCA). Advisers whose underlying custodian has failed will field the calls, regardless of where contractual responsibility sits.

The ePayments case cuts a different way. The Payment and Electronic Money Institution Insolvency Regulations 2021 created a bespoke regime with the explicit objective of returning customer funds as soon as reasonably practicable (FCA). But the FCA is blunt that the FSCS does not cover payment services, and customers depend on the firm's safeguarding arrangements (FCA). Boards of payments firms, and the banks that provide their safeguarding accounts, should expect renewed FCA attention to reconciliation quality, segregation evidence and the speed at which a trustee or administrator could identify what belongs to whom.

The outsourcing question boards keep deferring

Most firms that will feel the Jarvis fallout are not Jarvis clients directly. They are IFAs, discretionary managers and platforms whose end-investors sit, often invisibly, behind a chain of nominee and custody arrangements. The special administrators have asked clients to speak to their financial adviser or wealth manager in the first instance (FCA). That operational burden lands on firms that did not choose the insolvency and may not have modelled it. Consumer Duty obligations do not pause while an administrator reconciles a CASS estate.

For payments and e-money groups, the equivalent exposure runs through BIN sponsors, principal-agent relationships and safeguarding banks. Each ePayments-style failure tests whether the written safeguarding methodology survives contact with real-time insolvency. Senior leaders who cannot produce, on demand, a current map of where customer funds sit, which entity holds legal title, and how quickly a court-appointed administrator could release them, are carrying a risk their auditors and non-executives should already be pricing.

Two administrations in a week do not constitute a trend. They do, however, hand every board a free rehearsal. The firms that use it will be ready for the next one.

What this reveals

Two near-simultaneous special administrations expose a recurring blind spot: boards treat client-asset protection, safeguarding and FSCS perimeter as operational hygiene owned by compliance, not as live governance risks they must personally understand. The assumption that fails is that contractual delegation to a custodian or e-money partner also delegates the stakeholder consequences when that counterparty fails. Other leadership teams likely believe their outsourced custody or safeguarding arrangements are 'covered' because due diligence was done at onboarding, without testing whether their continuity, communications and redress playbooks still match today's counterparty reality. This matters because when a partner collapses, customers, advisers and regulators call the surviving firm, and the board's prior understanding of where assets sit becomes the story.

Questions accountable leaders should ask

  • 01Can your board state, without consulting a deck, exactly where client money and custody assets sit, under which legal regime, and what protection applies if the holding entity fails?
  • 02When did you last stress-test the failure of a key custodian, e-money partner or safeguarding bank, and did that test include customer communications, FSCS perimeter messaging and adviser handling?
  • 03If a counterparty entered special administration tomorrow, who in your firm would field the first regulator call, the first customer call, and the first journalist call, and are their scripts consistent?
  • 04How confident are you that your customer-facing explanations of FSCS coverage, safeguarding and segregation reflect the current legal reality rather than marketing copy written years ago?
  • 05What early-warning signals, such as voluntary requirements, supervisory restrictions or capital concerns at a partner firm, are you monitoring, and who sees them before the board does?

What accountable leaders should do now

  1. 1Commission a board-level map, within 30 days, of every third party holding client money, custody assets or safeguarded funds on your behalf, naming the entity, regime, protection perimeter and current supervisory status.
  2. 2Re-run your counterparty failure playbook as a live tabletop with the executive team, specifically testing the first 72 hours of customer, adviser, regulator and FSCS communications.
  3. 3Review every customer-facing statement about FSCS coverage, segregation and safeguarding and reconcile it with the current legal position, correcting anything that overstates protection, particularly for e-money and payments.
  4. 4Establish a standing watch on supervisory signals, voluntary requirements, restrictions, capital concerns, at your material counterparties, with a defined escalation route to the board risk committee.
  5. 5Ask internal audit or a skilled independent reviewer to confirm whether your assumptions about custodian and safeguarding partner resilience still match operational reality, and report findings to the board.

Explore the practical guide

This guide shows how to test whether your board's view of stakeholder priorities matches what regulators and adjacent decision-makers will actually demand during review. After reading, you will know how to structure that test, where assumptions typically break, and how to use the findings without undermining the board.

Read the guide

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