Fuenmayor decision puts SMCR disclosure duties back in the spotlight
The FCA's decision to fine BancTrust CEO Carlos Fuenmayor £99,600 for failing to disclose regulatory investigations and account freezes lands as a pointed reminder that personal disclosure obligations under the Senior Managers regime carry real consequences. For boards and nomination committees, it sharpens the question of what they actually verify about senior hires, not what candidates choose to share.
The FCA has decided to fine Carlos Fuenmayor, Chief Executive of BancTrust, £99,600 for failing to disclose three separate matters to the regulator, including a US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority investigation opened in December 2017 and subsequent sanction in June 2019, plus the freezing of his Venezuelan bank accounts by the National Financial Intelligence Unit of Venezuela shortly before a November 2019 inspection (FCA). Fuenmayor has referred the Decision Notice to the Upper Tribunal, so the findings remain provisional, but the regulator's positioning is already instructive (FCA).
Disclosure as a fitness test, not a formality
The FCA concluded Fuenmayor's failures were negligent and that he breached APER Statement of Principle 4 and Senior Manager Conduct Rule 4, which requires individuals to disclose information the FCA would reasonably expect (FCA). The regulator's framing matters: the harm identified is not the underlying conduct in the US or Venezuela, but the fact that non-disclosure denied the FCA the chance to assess fitness and propriety. Therese Chambers, executive director of enforcement and market oversight, said disclosing information the FCA reasonably expects, promptly, is 'key to maintaining trust in financial services' (FCA). For senior managers, that reframes disclosure from a paperwork exercise to a continuing duty whose breach is itself the misconduct.
The board accountability problem
The failures persisted through application forms submitted on behalf of BancTrust until December 2021, a window of roughly four years from the start of the FIRA investigation (FCA). That gap raises uncomfortable questions for nomination committees and chairs at smaller authorised firms: what independent verification sits behind SMCR attestations, and how often is it refreshed. Most firms rely on candidate self-declaration backed by criminal records checks and references. Foreign regulatory action, particularly outside the major Anglophone jurisdictions, and overseas asset freezes rarely surface through standard screening. Boards that treat annual fit and proper certification as a sign-off rather than an active inquiry are carrying a risk the FCA has now priced.
A pattern, not an isolated case
The Fuenmayor decision arrives in the same news cycle as the court-confirmed special administration of Euro Exchange Securities UK Limited, where the FCA cited 'serious concerns' about the firm's operation and 'significant risks of financial crime', including weaknesses in governance and ownership (FCA). Matthew Long, director of payments and digital assets at the FCA, said fighting financial crime 'is at the heart of our strategy' (FCA). Read together, the two actions signal that the regulator is willing to pursue both firms and individuals where governance and disclosure shortcomings intersect with financial crime risk, and to do so using its fullest available powers, including the first use of the Payment and Electronic Money Institution Insolvency Regulations 2021 (FCA).
What senior leaders should take from this
The practical implication is narrow and clear. Chairs, SMF16 and SMF17 holders, and heads of compliance should be asking three questions this quarter: whether their fit and proper process actively tests for overseas regulatory action and asset restrictions, whether ongoing disclosure obligations are reinforced beyond onboarding, and whether the firm can evidence what it knew, and when, about every senior manager on its register. The Fuenmayor case will be litigated at the Upper Tribunal, but the standard the FCA is asserting is already operative.
Sources
What this reveals
The Fuenmayor decision exposes a governance gap that most boards and nomination committees quietly carry: fit and proper assessment is largely an act of trust in candidate self-declaration, dressed up as verification. The assumption that has failed is that criminal checks, references and annual attestations constitute genuine due diligence on senior individuals whose regulatory histories may span jurisdictions the firm never actively searches. Leadership teams elsewhere may believe their SMCR processes are robust because they follow the standard template, when in fact the template was never designed to catch foreign regulatory action, overseas asset freezes, or ongoing investigations the individual chooses not to volunteer. The wider issue is that personal accountability regimes only function if the firm treats disclosure as something it verifies, not something it receives.
Questions accountable leaders should ask
- 01What independent verification, beyond candidate self-declaration and standard screening, actually sits behind your SMF attestations, and when was it last refreshed for incumbent senior managers?
- 02How would your firm currently detect a foreign regulatory investigation, overseas enforcement action, or asset freeze affecting a senior manager if the individual chose not to disclose it?
- 03When your nomination committee last approved a senior hire, could it point to specific evidence it had tested, or did it rely on the candidate's own account and a clean UK screening report?
- 04Does your annual fit and proper certification process include an active inquiry into changes in personal, legal or regulatory circumstances, or is it a sign-off exercise?
- 05If the FCA asked tomorrow how your board discharges its responsibility to verify what senior managers disclose, would the answer withstand scrutiny or reveal a reliance on assumed honesty?
What accountable leaders should do now
- 1Commission a targeted review of the verification steps behind current SMF holders' fit and proper status, focusing on cross-border regulatory history, overseas financial exposures and any known investigations, and document what was actually tested rather than assumed.
- 2Redesign the annual fit and proper certification process so it prompts active inquiry into specific categories of change, foreign regulatory action, asset freezes, litigation, rather than a general attestation, and record the questions asked as well as the answers given.
- 3Upgrade pre-appointment due diligence for senior hires to include structured searches across relevant foreign regulators and enforcement databases, particularly where the candidate has operated outside the UK, and make this a nomination committee standard rather than an optional add-on.
- 4Establish a clear internal escalation route for senior managers to disclose emerging matters between formal attestation cycles, and test whether individuals understand that continuing disclosure is itself the duty.
- 5Present the outcome of this review to the board with a candid assessment of where reliance on self-declaration remains, so the board can make an informed judgement about the residual risk rather than assume it has been eliminated.
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