Amplifi's collapse exposes the credit broker dependency risk hiding in plain sight

Amplifi Capital (U.K.) Limited entered administration on 9 June 2026, with Robert Spence and Gareth Slater of Interpath Advisory appointed as joint administrators (FCA). The failure matters less for its size than for its shape: Amplifi was the connective tissue between consumers and two credit unions, My Community Bank and Castle Community Bank, through its My Community Finance broker arm, while also issuing personal loans directly under Reevo Money (FCA). When that tissue tears, the institutions on either side feel it before regulators can intervene.

The immediate consumer message is orderly. Existing loan agreements remain in place, repayments continue as normal, and loans or savings with MCB or CCB are unaffected by the administration (FCA). But the structural message to senior leaders is sharper. Amplifi can no longer issue new loans, which means the credit unions it fed have lost an origination channel overnight (FCA). Any lender or savings institution that relies on a single regulated intermediary for customer acquisition now has a live case study in concentration risk to put in front of its board.

The FSCS position compounds the point. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme does not cover consumer credit lenders, so any compensation for outstanding complaints or refunds will be paid through the administration process and is not guaranteed (FCA). For customers with live cases at the Financial Ombudsman Service, the route now runs through Amplifi's customer support teams or the administrators (FCA). Boards at consumer credit firms should be testing, in concrete terms, how their own complaint pipelines and redress liabilities would behave inside an insolvency. The Consumer Duty does not pause when an administrator arrives, but the practical mechanics of fair treatment become considerably harder.

This sits alongside a second FCA-led intervention in the same week. The High Court confirmed the appointment of Duncan Perring and James Bennett of Teneo as joint special administrators of Euro Exchange Securities UK Limited under the Payment and Electronic Money Institution Insolvency Regulations 2021, after the FCA cited systemic weaknesses in financial crime controls, safeguarding, ownership and governance (FCA). Matthew Long, director of payments and digital assets at the FCA, said 'Fighting financial crime is at the heart of our strategy, and that means using our powers to their fullest extent to protect consumers and the integrity of the financial system' (FCA). Two failures in two segments, both involving regulated non-banks that sit upstream or alongside banking infrastructure, point to a regulator increasingly willing to force exit rather than supervise recovery.

For senior leaders, the practical positioning is threefold. First, map third-party origination and intermediation dependencies as counterparty exposures, not procurement relationships. Second, stress-test redress and complaints workflows for a scenario where the counterparty is in administration and the FSCS does not apply. Third, recognise that partnerships with credit unions, e-money firms and consumer credit specialists carry reputational transfer risk that survives the failure of the partner. The FCA is no longer waiting for disorderly outcomes. Boards that have not recently audited their dependency stack are working from an out-of-date map.