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PRA closes the Basel 3.1 book: market risk rules tilt toward international parity

The PRA has published its consultation on the internal model approach to market risk, the final component of Basel 3.1 implementation in the UK. The proposals signal a more accommodative posture on trading book capital, with implications for how UK banks position against US and EU competitors.

The PRA has put the last brick in the Basel 3.1 wall. On 19 June 2026 it published a consultation on the internal model approach (IMA) to market risk, the rules governing how banks with significant trading operations calculate capital against potential trading losses (Bank of England). The headline is not the technical detail but the framing: Sam Woods has explicitly tied the timing and substance of the proposals to what other jurisdictions are doing, a meaningful shift in tone from a regulator that has historically led rather than waited.

The concessions are targeted but consequential. The monitoring period for the profit and loss attribution test, the gateway determining whether a desk can use internal models at all, has been extended from one year to three, giving the PRA time to calibrate before the test bites on capital (Bank of England). The treatment of non-modellable risk factors, long a source of capital inflation under the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, is being narrowed to allow more modelling where appropriate. And the PRA is removing a perverse outcome where firms transitioning from the standardised approach to full IMA could see capital requirements rise during the journey. Each adjustment, on its own, is technical. Taken together, they reduce the implicit penalty for running a sophisticated trading book in London.

For senior leaders, the strategic question is whether this changes the calculus on where to book activity. Sam Woods, Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation, said the proposals ensure 'that trading activities by banks in the UK are appropriately capitalised' while accounting for implementation elsewhere (Bank of England). The subtext: the PRA is alert to the risk that misaligned calibration drives business to New York or Frankfurt. CFOs and treasurers at international banks should be rerunning capital impact studies on the assumption that the UK number is now closer to, rather than above, the US equivalent. Heads of market risk should expect supervisors to scrutinise IMA applications more rigorously precisely because the gate has been widened.

The broader signal matters too. This is the second prudential move in a fortnight, alongside the Bank's stablecoin policy statement raising the cap on interest-bearing backing assets from 60% to 70% (Bank of England), where the UK is consciously calibrating to support viable business models rather than maximising prudential conservatism. Boards should read this as a durable adjustment in regulatory posture rather than a one-off concession. The competitiveness and growth objective, often dismissed as rhetorical, is now visibly shaping rule design.

There are risks in this direction of travel. A more permissive IMA regime works only if supervision is tight enough to catch model drift before it becomes a loss event. Firms that read the consultation as a green light to expand trading risk without commensurate investment in model governance will find themselves on the wrong side of the next supervisory cycle. The PRA has bought itself optionality through the extended monitoring window; it will use that data.

The implication for boards: Basel 3.1 is now a known quantity in the UK, and the competitive question shifts from compliance cost to capital allocation. Those still treating it as a regulatory project rather than a strategic input are behind.

What this reveals

The PRA's shift from prudential leadership to international calibration exposes a deeper problem: many UK banks have built capital, booking and business location assumptions on the premise that the UK will remain the most conservative jurisdiction. When a regulator visibly re-anchors to peer parity, the internal models, board narratives and competitive positioning built on the old assumption quietly become stale. Leadership teams elsewhere may wrongly believe their own regulatory reads are still current simply because no rule has formally changed, when in fact the posture beneath the rule has moved. This matters because the most consequential regulatory shifts are often tonal before they are textual, and firms that only track the text miss the window to act.

Questions accountable leaders should ask

  • 01When did we last revisit the assumptions in our capital and booking model against the PRA's current posture, rather than the posture in place when the model was built?
  • 02Do our board papers on trading book strategy still describe the UK as a capital-punitive jurisdiction relative to the US and EU, and is that description still accurate?
  • 03Who inside the firm is responsible for detecting shifts in regulatory tone before they become shifts in regulatory text, and how is that intelligence reaching the executive?
  • 04If supervisors scrutinise IMA applications more rigorously because the gate has widened, are our model governance, desk-level evidence and P&L attribution processes ready for that level of challenge?
  • 05Where else in our regulatory landscape might we be operating on a read of the room that is six to twelve months out of date?

What accountable leaders should do now

  1. 1Commission a rerun of trading book capital impact studies under the revised PRA proposals, benchmarked explicitly against US and EU calibration, and bring the results to the next risk committee rather than waiting for the annual cycle.
  2. 2Task the CRO and head of market risk with a readiness assessment for more rigorous IMA supervisory scrutiny, focusing on P&L attribution evidence, non-modellable risk factor treatment, and desk-level model governance.
  3. 3Ask the executive to identify two or three other regulatory areas where the firm's working assumption may lag current supervisory posture, and set a short timetable to test those assumptions externally.
  4. 4Reframe the board narrative on UK trading operations to reflect the PRA's stated intent of international parity, so that strategic decisions on booking location and headcount are made against the current regulatory reality, not the historical one.
  5. 5Establish a standing mechanism for capturing tonal signals from supervisors, speeches and consultation framing, and feeding them into strategy reviews before they become codified rules.

Explore the practical guide

This guide identifies the specific points at which board-level strategic thinking diverges from what regulators actually care about, and how those gaps become visible too late. After reading, you will be able to diagnose the drift inside your own organisation and reset the communication flow before it creates supervisory friction.

Read the guide

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